Themelios describes itself as “an international, evangelical, peer-reviewed theological journal that expounds and defends the historic Christian faith.” Operated by The Gospel Coalition, this journal largely represents my theological tribe: evangelical with a Reformed bent. Tony Gray is an Oxford trained theologian who has contributed articles to many journals, including one (“Destroyed Forever: An Examination of the Debates Concerning Annihilation and Conditional Immortality”) for the January 1996 edition of Themelios. Having recently read “Destroyed Forever,” I want to offer some thoughts on it, first by expressing my appreciation for several aspects of the article, and then by offering some critiques.
What I Appreciate
I appreciate the fact that Gray argues for annihilationism as “at the very least an option which ought to be considered fairly and honestly.” Rather than writing it off as heresy, he strives for charity. Not wanting to fall into the trap of many traditionalists, who “have often not listened to the arguments themselves,” he engages with sufficient charity that he recognizes a danger in his writing: that arguments for conditionalism may at times appear stronger than arguments against it. I don’t sense that imbalance myself, but I understand why a traditionalist might consider him to be too kind to conditionalism and conditionalists, many of whom, he believes, “can quite rightly be labelled as pillars of conservative orthodoxy.” Most significantly, I appreciate his assertion that “if annihilation is true, a gospel still remains to be taught, and it is a gospel that is just as desperately needed.” He does not assume that an embrace of annihilationism is a rejection of the biblical gospel but that both conditionalism and traditionalism are consistent with the gospel.
Related to the above, I appreciate the fact that Gray interacts directly with conditionalists rather than with traditionalists who misrepresent the conditionalist perspective. He engages primarily with John Wenham and John Stott, but interweaves this engagement by also interacting with other conditionalists.
I appreciate, with a significant caveat that I will unpack below, Gray’s definition of conditionalism: “Conditional immortality is the name given to the doctrine that states that human beings are not inherently immortal, but rather have immortality conferred upon them as part of the experience of salvation.” That is an accurate definition. He further correctly recognizes that conditionalism and annihilationism are not precisely synonymous, but that “annihilationism, which is usually associated with conditional immortality, states that the wicked will not suffer conscious torment forever bur that after death and judgment they will be destroyed, ceasing to exist. Annihilationism is thus virtually a corollary of conditional immortality.” While he does, as many do (including myself), use the terms “conditionalism” and “annihilationism” interchangeably throughout his article, he at least recognizes that, technically, there is a distinction.
I appreciate the fact that Gray quickly dismisses the misconception that evangelical annihilationism is the same as secular humanism (“annihilationism is to be distinguished from the humanist belief that there is no life after death”) and is careful to avoid the error of guilt by association (“conditionalism must never be seen as a part of a package of beliefs”). These are errors that many critics of conditionalism do not take care to avoid.
I appreciate the fact that Gray does not imagine that he has exhaustively addressed the arguments. “Any biblical investigation into this topic requires the examination of a large amount of material.” He admits that his engagement is quite narrow, focusing on a small handful of texts and a few theological arguments.
Finally, I appreciate that Gray recognizes that there are different strands of annihilationism and that annihilationists cannot all be painted with a single brush.
Where It Falls Short
Having said everything above, I do believe that the article falls short in a few significant ways. As I say that, I recognize that it was published in January 1996, and that a lot of hermeneutical, exegetical, and theological work has been done by evangelical conditionalists since then. He asserts that “much work needs to be done” to address conditionalism’s shortcomings. Much work has been done since 1996, and it is unfair to imagine that he should have engaged that work 25 years ago. The article could desperately use an update. Still, those who read the article today need to be aware of some of that work.
I have already expressed appreciation for his definition of conditionalism, but his follow-up definition of annihilationism falls short in one major way. He makes the all-too-common error of describing annihilationism as the belief that the wicked be destroyed “after death and judgment.” He repeats this error later when he writes that “evangelicals believing in annihilation wish to distance themselves from [humanist] belief, and generally accept that destruction occurs after judgment and appropriate punishment.” He reiterates this later when he summarizes that “conditionalists envisage death for the sinner, then subsequently resurrection, then punishment, and then destruction.”
While this position may describe one strand of conditionalism, it would have offered a fairer evaluation of the position to recognize that many annihilationists consider destruction to be the punishment for sin, rather than to follow appropriate punishment for sin. At one point, he defines “annihilation” as “eternal death” (as opposed to the “conscious hell” of “eternal suffering”) but then strangely posits that annihilationism promotes destruction after punishment. In fact, annihilationism (or, at least, one form of annihilationism) affirms that death (or destruction) is God’s punishment for sin, not that destruction follows punishment. It is not as if suffering is the punishment, which is then mercifully terminated by death. This is an oft-repeated misunderstanding of evangelical conditionalism, which Gray furthers.
While addressing the language of Scripture, Gray distinguishes between “ultimate destruction” (the position of annihilationism) and “perishing.” He equates “perishing” with “being ruined” while “the object remains in existence.” In this way, he shows that traditionalism is consistent with textual references to the unredeemed perishing (e.g. John 3:16). He does not, however, address the fact that conditionalists consider “perishing” to be synonymous with “ultimate destruction.” He assumes a distinction between destruction and perishing without arguing for it in any significant way.
To be fair, he does make a cursory case for this distinction, but it is very cursory. He recognizes that “the use of apollumi (to destroy), when employed in an active form, points toward extinction.” He then argues that “the verb can be in a middle form, and then has the connotation of perishing.” This gives the impression that the word in an active form always means to destroy while, in a middle voice, it always means to perish (as he defines perish). He offers 2 Peter 2:9 as an example of the middle voice usage, though I assume he means 2 Peter 3:9, since apollumi is not found in 2:9. Peter writes of “the Lord … not wanting any to perish but all to come to repentance.” Appolumi is, indeed, in a middle voice in this verse, but it is far from clear that the word here does not have reference to death or destruction, or that this single use means that the middle voice always means to perish rather than to destroy (again, assuming his definition). Indeed, Jesus used the same word in the middle voice when he warned that “all who take up the sword will perish by the sword” (Matthew 26:52), which clearly seems to indicate the death of the swordsman. To be sure, appolumi doesn’t necessarilyrefer to death or ultimate destruction, but it can—even in a middle voice—and each occurrence must be taken on its own merit.
Another critique that Gray offers of conditionalism is that it is a relatively recent theological innovation. While “universalism’s pedigree extends back to the early church and Origen’s theory of apokatastasis … conditional immortality has a much shorter history, and the suspicion that this is a ‘new’ idea has caused evangelicals, whichever position they take on the debate, to be hesitant when discussing the matter.” He doesn’t substantiate this claim in any meaningful fashion, which is unfortunate, since it can be argued that conditionalism has a far greater pedigree that he gives credit for.
I find it frustrating that many of the questions he raises on a textual basis have been adequately addressed by conditionalists with whom he did not engage (though I recognize again that much of this work was done after 1996). For example, the questions that he raises on the basis of Revelation 14:10–11 and 20:10 have been addressed more comprehensively by some with whom he does not interact. He similarly raises questions on the basis of other texts (Mark 9:48; Matthew 25:46; etc.), which have been thoroughly addressed by conditionalist thinkers with whom he does not engage. Surely this calls for an updated article addressing the work that has been done since 1996.
Some of the conditionalist arguments that he raises are irrelevant to me. For example, I realize that the argument that “eternal” is better translated “the age to come” is a position that some conditionalists take, but I do not share that opinion. As you read Gray, however, you might be mistaken for thinking that annihilationismdepends on this redefinition of the word when, in fact, conditionalism is perfectly consistent with “eternal punishment.”
Gray’s contention that certain texts of Scripture assume human immortality is spurious. The fact that humans are “made in the image of God, made for life and not mortality, and made for communion with God” hardly assumes the immortality of the unredeemed. Similarly, the human “desire for eternal things which in turn implies a spiritual dimension” does not necessarily imply human immortality. He does better when he concludes that “much work needs to be done” on “assumptions concerning immortality.”
Conclusion
There is much to commend in Gray’s assessment of evangelical conditionalism, but there is as much to critique. It would be fascinating to see him interact with conditionalist theology post-1996. I would like to think that he would do it as irenically, which would, perhaps, help him to appreciate annihilationist argumentation even better.
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