“When it comes to hell, we can’t afford to be wrong.” So write Francis Chan and Preston Sprinkle, as quoted by Lee Strobel in his critique of annihilationism in The Case for Heaven. Persuaded of the traditional view of hell, Strobel, on the back of an interview with Christian philosopher Paul Copan, offers his opinion on the weakness of the case for conditional immortality.
While I appreciate Strobel’s apologetic work, and have benefited from his labor in the past, his critique of annihilationism is poor. He is either ill-informed of what annihilationists actually teach or is prepared to misrepresent them in his critique, and the biblical evidence he offers is shoddy and often assumes the argument he makes.
Poor Definitions
From the outset, Strobel offers an inaccurate definition of annihilationism. He claims that annihilationists teach “the unredeemed are snuffed out of existence forever, perhaps after a limited period of punishment for their sins in hell.” This definition is problematic for at least two reasons.
The first reason may be somewhat subjective. This may not be true for everyone, but “snuffed out” conjures in my mind images of a quick, painless process. A candle is “snuffed out with a quick breath.” This stands at odds with the violent imagery of the wicked perishing. As stated previously, when the word is used of humans, “perish” can be defined as to “die, especially in a violent or sudden way.” Conditionalism takes seriously the violent imagery of final punishment and teaches that the wicked will be violently killed or destroyed in hell, not merely “snuffed out.”
Second, however, and more importantly, annihilationism does not teach that the death with which the wicked are punished comes “after a limited period of punishment for their sins in hell.” At least, not all annihilationists teach that. John Stackhouse’s affirmation of “terminal punishment,” for example, may lean in this direction. Many annihilationists, however—the present writer included—take exception to this position. Annihilationism affirms, not that death comes after the punishment, but that death is the punishment. And since that death will never be reversed, it is an eternal, and not a limited, punishment. It is unfortunate that Strobel continues the legacy of such sloppy effort in (mis)defining the position he seeks to critique.
Strobel continues the pattern of poorly defining the position he critiques when he writes that, in conditional immortality, “the wicked simply cease to exist when they die” or “are resurrected for the final judgment and then consigned to hell for a limited period of punishment, after which their lives are extinguished forever.”
No evangelical conditionalist would affirm the finality of human existence at death. Evangelical annihilationists affirm the reality of resurrection and judgement to follow. Nor do annihilationists affirm that the flames of hell will be “a limited period of punishment” followed by death. As observed above, Strobel fails to grasp the conditionalist perspective that death itself is the punishment for sin. He writes that annihilationism “contradicts … eternal punishment” only because he fails to understand what conditionalism teaches.
Later, quoting Craig Blomberg, Strobel claims that annihilationists define hell as “just a lack of conscious existence.” Once again, this is a terribly misinformed caricature of the annihilationist position. Conditionalists believe that hell is the place in which, or the event at which, unrepentant sinners are violently executed for their sin. It is unfortunately, though perhaps unsurprising, that Strobel and Blomberg resort to such a poor definition to critique conditional immortality.
Oddly, Strobel later inadvertently highlights the folly of his own definitions of annihilationism. He repeatedly defines annihilationism as cessation of existence—a definition that annihilationists do not affirm. Then, referencing the worms of Mark 9:48, which consume the corpses of those slain at the final judgement, he asks, “What’s the big deal about a worm feeding on your body if you no longer exist?” The question should be obvious: How can a worm feed on a body that doesn’t exist? His definition of annihilationism cannot stand under the weight of the text. But be clear: It is his definition of annihilationism, not the annihilationist’s definition, that is the problem.
Strobel would do far better to engage with an annihilationist and ask for his definition of the term than place an ill-informed definition on the position. It is easier to critique a straw man, but it is also intellectually dishonest.
Appealing to Councils
Strobel asserts that “the Second Council of Constantinople (553) and the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517) both condemned annihilationism.” This claim betrays either grave misunderstanding or blatant misrepresentation.
The Second Council of Constantinople did not condemn annihilationism. The Council possibly condemned the teachings of Origen. Many historians question the veracity of the Origen-condemning canons that emerged from this Council. Even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that the Council did condemn the teachings of Origen, he was a universalist, not an annihilationist. I find it difficult to believe that Strobel does not know the difference between annihilationism and universalism. I can only conclude that he is either repeating a well-worn argument without having confirmed it, or that he is deliberately misrepresenting the council to deceive people into dismissing annihilationism without giving it a fair hearing. I imagine that it is the first, which unfortunately highlights his sloppy understanding of the position he seeks to critique.
It is strange that Strobel references the Fifth Lateran Council since Protestants, among whom are evangelicals, do not consider the Councils that late in church history to carry much authority. This Council is accepted as authoritative by the Catholic Church, but Protestants usually consider, at the most, the first seven Councils (ending with the Second Council of Nicea in 787 AD) to carry some form of ecumenical authority. While this Council affirmed that the human soul is, by nature, immortal, or else the incarnation was useless and the resurrection unnecessary, evangelicals—annihilationist and traditionalist alike—will give this Council little thought. If Strobel considers this Council authoritative one wonders if he would similarly insist that Protestants accept the legitimacy of the Church-sanctioned war against the Turks to reclaim the Holy Land, which the Council also affirmed.
Textual and Philosophical Arguments
Strobel summarizes John Stott’s arguments in favor of annihilationism before resuming the record of his interview with Paul Copan, referenced in Part 1 of this response.
He quotes Copan’s opinion that “all humans will be raised with bodies—the redeemed having immortal resurrection bodies like Christ’s, and the unredeemed receiving bodies that enable them to physically exist in their state of restlessness.” He footnotes John 5:29 in support of this opinion. In that verse, Jesus prophesies the general resurrection in which “those who have done good things” will be raised “to the resurrection of life” while “those who have done wicked things” will be raised “to the resurrection of condemnation.” While this verse certainly affirms the resurrection of the wicked, it nowhere suggests that the wicked will receive a body that exists in a perpetual state of torment. “Condemnation” does not necessarily imply consciousness. One can as easily be condemned to death.
Strobel continues to assess Jesus’ testimony regarding final punishment. He admits that “Jesus doesn’t say ‘eternal torture’” but observes that “he does talk about the wailing and gnashing of teeth.” He seemingly considers this incontrovertible evidence that Jesus affirmed post-mortem torment for sinners. But even if wailing and gnashing of teeth do suggest physical pain (and there is little reason to think this is so), Scripture does not suggest that the wailing and gnashing will continue for eternity. Strobel believes that of weeping and gnashing of teeth “describe the state of separation from God” though he offers no exegesis to support this supposition. This imagery “doesn’t sound like immediate extinction to me.” Perhaps not, but that does nothing to refute annihilationism, which does not depend on a notion of “immediate extinction.”
As further evidence against conditional immortality, Strobel cites Daniel 12:2, “which speak[s] of those who would be resurrected to everlasting contempt.” He argues that “the obvious grammatical contrast between the unending well-being of the righteous and the unending shame and contempt of the wicked” clearly proves eternal, conscious torment. “To limit the suffering of the wicked without limiting the bliss of the righteous is grammatically impossible.” While I agree that “eternal” cannot be limited in one clause without necessarily limiting it in the next, he seems to assume, without arguing for it, that “eternal contempt” describes the experience of the wicked. “Contempt” must be experienced suffering, in his view. But the word translated “contempt” properly describes something that is an object of contempt rather that something that feels or experiences contempt. The only other occurrence of this word is in Isaiah 66:24, where the corpses of the dead are said to be “a horror to all mankind.” It is clear here that the corpses are viewed with horror rather than experiencing horror. Daniel 12:2 can be interpreted similarly to describe, not the experience of the resurrected wicked, but the way in which they are viewed by the righteous. This text in fact poses no problem for annihilationists.
Referencing Matthew 25:46, Strobel highlights Jesus’ teaching that the punishment of the wicked will be eternal. “That’s a formidable challenge for annihilationists,” he writes. This again displays a poor understanding of annihilationism, which wholeheartedly affirms the eternal punishment of the wicked. Strobel’s argument works if we assume that “punishment” means “conscious torment.” If that is so, the eternal punishment of the wicked must be eternal, conscious torment. But he assumes his understanding without arguing for it. “Eternal punishment” is hardly a “formidable challenge” for annihilationists, who affirm that the death with which the wicked will be punished will, indeed, be eternal death. Strobel assumes that annihilationists can only explain this verse by redefining “eternal,” which is simply not true.
As further evidence of eternal, conscious torment, Strobel quotes Revelation 20:10 where he argues that the word translated “tormented,” which describes the fate of the beast and the false prophet (and presumably the unredeemed dead), “indicates conscious suffering.” That may be true, but he fails to recognize that that conscious suffering is portrayed in the vision. When the vision is interpreted, the fate is described as “the second death” (20:14). He fails to acknowledge a distinction between what is seen in the imagery and the way in which that image is to be interpreted.
Strobel continues to raise several objections to annihilationism.
He highlights the annihilationist argument that the Bible consistently speaks of the punishment of the wicked in terms of destruction. He admits that this “sounds an awful lot like annihilationism” but dismisses it when he writes, “Destruction doesn’t always mean cease to exist.” While this is true, two things must be said in response.
First, as we have seen above, annihilationism doesn’t define “destruction” as ceasing to exist. Throughout his critique, Strobel defines annihilationism in ways that annihilationists do not. This is another example.
Second, to argue that a word “doesn’t always” mean something is not the same as arguing that it never means that thing. “Destruction” may not always refer to cessation, but sometimes it does. Each text must be taken on its own merit. Strobel argues that it “doesn’t always” mean cessation and then assumed that it never does.
Strobel claims that 2 Thessalonians 1:9 mitigates against annihilationism because it “says the unrepentant will be ‘punished with everlasting destruction and shut out from the presence of the Lord.’” He asks, “Why mention being excluded from God’s presence if ‘everlasting destruction’ means they have totally perished?” This line of reasoning conveniently relies on the NIV’s very questionable translation of 2 Thessalonians 1:9.
The NIV is the only mainstream translation that supplies the words “and shut out” to 2 Thessalonians 1:9, and it does so unnecessarily. The CSB offers a more direct translation when it speaks of “eternal destruction from the Lord’s presence.” The eternal destruction flows from and is the result of the Lord’s presence.
He suggests that annihilationism cannot make sense of Matthew 5:29–30, where Jesus claimed that maiming is preferable to being cast into hell. If the wicked “simply crease to exist,” he argues, Jesus’ words lose their force. Perhaps so, but since annihilationism teaches that the wicked are violently executed in hell, and do not “simply cease to exist,” Strobel would do well to rethink his argument.
Quoting Craig Blomberg, he adds, “If hell is just lack of conscious existence, there would be a lot of situations in which people would find that to be more desirable than suffering as a maimed person in this life.” He argues along similar lines a little further on when he contends that conscious torment “is far more severe than death.”
Overlooking the repeated poor definition of annihilationism, which I have dealt with above, we should note that, even if we grant that annihilationism is “preferable” to eternal, conscious torment, it does not negate the annihilationist perspective. The nature of hell is determined by what the Bible teaches, not by what is preferable or otherwise. The suggestion seems to be that eternal, conscious torment must be true because it is a worse punishment than annihilationism. This begs the question, if we can conceive of a worse punishment than eternal, conscious torment, must we affirm that punishment because eternal, conscious torment would be preferable to it? Of course not. We look to Scripture to determine what the punishment of hell is.
Strobel later argues that the language of unquenchable fire (Mark 9:48) disproves annihilationism because “if a person ceases to exist, why emphasize that the fire does not go out?” This might be a reasonable question if, Jesus said that the fire does not go out. To say that fire will not be quenched, however, is not the same as saying it will not go out. An “unquenchable” fire cannot be stopped by an external force, but that does not mean it will not naturally stop when it has consumed all its fuel. There is a difference between a fire that cannot be quenched and one that does not die out.
In the ultimate irony, Strobel favorably quotes Robert Peterson, whose words appear for more fitting a description of traditionalism than annihilationism: “Despite good intentions, the conditionalist exegesis of the key texts falls short.” Like most critiques of conditional immortality, Strobel relies on broad mischaracterization of the annihilationist position and questionable exegesis of the texts that speak of final judgment. His assessment of conditional immortality is woefully inadequate and his argument for eternal, conscious torment exegetically weak. For all the appreciation I have for Strobel’s apologetic work, I am saddened that, in this chapter, he fails to present a cogent critique of annihilationism or a compelling defense of eternal, conscious torment.
Recent Comments